Page 95 of Cry Havoc

Then came plates with a selection of cheeses. Gaston chose a 1963 Quinta do Noval port to go with them.

“An homage to the Portuguese. They were the first Europeans to arrive in Vietnam in the sixteenth century,” he explained. “I often lunch with the Portuguese ambassador at the Cercle Sportif, which has the side benefit of access to bottles of otherwise difficult to obtain vintage port.”

The finale was dessert: small chocolate profiteroles, a French pastry with sweet cream filling, served with coffee in the smallest coffee cups Tom had ever seen. Two sugar cubes offset the bitter taste.

The meal had taken over three hours.

Ella lit up a long cigarette, so Tom took the opportunity to do the same, the nicotine putting just the right finishing touch to the evening’s meal.

Serrano stirred both his sugar cubes into his small cup.

“Monsieur DuBois,” he said. “I was hoping you might share with us your thoughts on Tet.”

“You know,” Gaston said. “Some used to say the French owned Vietnam because they civilized it. It ended up not working out for the French. Tet gives us a window into the future. America will be next.”

“We hear reports that the NVA lost a generation of fighters,” Serrano said.

“I understand that it was primarily Viet Cong, but the North will just replenish them with NVA. And, yes, they suffered staggering losses, yet you are not any closer to achieving your objectives than you were three years ago when you flooded the country with troops. They hit over one hundred cities and are still fighting in many of them.”

“Do you believe the war is going to become both a conventional battle and an insurgency?”

“Westmoreland wants a conventional war. He toldTimemagazine that he hoped the communists would try something, because he was lookingfor a fight. He seems to have gotten his wish. In a speech not long after, he said that the communists were unable to mount a major offensive. He was wrong.”

“Some say that the Viet Cong are about to enter what is called a third phase of the war, transitioning from guerrilla tactics to large-scale conventional engagements.”

“And why would they do that, Mr. Serrano? Why would they suddenly switch to the methods of warfare in which their enemy so obviously excels? Their guerrilla tactics have been successful. Why change a winning strategy? Your generals may hope with all their hearts that they get to fight the NVA and VC in another D-Day, but it is not to be. Not in Vietnam.”

“We are learning tough lessons.”

“Mr. Smith, what did you learn from Tet?”

Tom cleared his throat.

“Well, it illustrates that the NVA can plan and coordinate. They hit the embassy to show we are vulnerable. It revealed the popular support for the VC, and it highlighted their courage,” Tom added.

“Excuse me?” Gaston said.

“It takes courage to take on the U.S.”

“It does. Gentlemen, if I may.”

“Please,” Serrano said.

“They have been studying you. They infiltrated the cities. You had been telling the world that the cities were safe. The VC and NVA proved you wrong. That may very well end up being the most lasting impact of Tet. Mr. Smith, do you know what District Eight is?”

“No.”

“It was the gold standard, an area of Saigon built up by the Americans. It’s where Westmoreland took visiting senators to showcase what was possible in Vietnam. Homes were built with none of the overcrowding found in most of the city—clean water, electricity, TVs, refrigerators. And today it is in ruins. Ho and Giap knew if they had a VC presence there as part ofTet then the American military would destroy it for them, along with the pipe dream that it could become a reality for all Vietnam. The Viet Minh used a similar tactic in Hanoi against the French in ’46. Both in Hanoi and Saigon the results were the same: gunships, artillery, destruction. Now the people see the Americans, not the VC, as having destroyed their homes, killed their husband or wife, mother or father, son or daughter. How can you blame them? The VC don’t have helicopter gunships or bombers. The Americans do. You may have created more VC than you killed.”

“You may be right,” Tom agreed.

“The attacks around the country are important, but none are as important as what happened in Saigon. They proved they could hit the epicenter of American power in Vietnam, and they brought that victory into the living rooms of the American voter, showing them that American blood is being spilled here, not just in the hamlets, but in the heart of Saigon.”

“The press isn’t helping,” Serrano offered.

“Your press, Halberstam and Sheehan in particular, assassinated Diêm and Nhu on the page well before soldiers put bullets and knives to them in the back of an armored personnel carrier that was supposed to give them safe passage to the airport and out of the country in ’63. Killed in an accidental suicide, isn’t that right, Mr. Serrano? We may never know exactly what happened, but your Ambassador Lodge seemed to have a penchant for playing God. I do not know why neither Kennedy nor Johnson did not remove him earlier. That coup has come to haunt us all. Maybe they both feared Lodge would run against them for president? Or perhaps they intended to use him as a scapegoat for a failing war while at the same time marginalizing him politically? Regardless of the reason, that line of thinking backfired. Did Diêm’s ousting solve the Buddhist problem? It just exacerbated it with more monks self-immolating in the months after the coup than in all Diêm’s years as president. And where were thoseNew York TimesandWashington Postarticles then? Perhaps the truth no longer fit their purposes? Your press is complicit in thisstory, in the exacerbation of this war. And they are watching it play out from the roof of the Caravelle Hotel.”

“What is our biggest hurdle after Tet?” Serrano asked.