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“In terms of one hundred percent proof, we don’t have that,” said Barber. “But we think there is a very high likelihood that the information is accurate.”

“What makes you so sure?” asked the USAF general.

“As you gentlemen have probably already guessed, we have for some months past had an asset working for us high in the hierarchy in Baghdad.”

There was a series of assenting grunts.

“Didn’t figure all that target information was coming from Langley’s crystal ball,” said the Air Force g

eneral, who still resented the CIA doubting his pilots’ hit record.

“The point is,” said Laing, “so far, we have never found his information to be anything but bang-on accurate. If he’s lying now, it’s a hell of a scam. Second point is, can we take that risk?”

There was silence for several minutes.

“There’s one thing you guys are overlooking,” said the USAF man. “Delivery.”

“Delivery?” asked Barber.

“Right. Having a weapon is one thing; delivering it right on top of your enemy is another. Look, no one can believe Saddam is into miniaturization yet. That’s hypertech. So he can’t launch this thing, if he has it, from a tank gun. Or an artillery piece—same caliber. Or a Katyushka-type battery. Or a rocket.”

“Why not a rocket, General?”

“Payload,” said the flier sarcastically. “Goddam payload. If this is a crude device, we have to be looking at half a ton. A thousand pounds, say. We now know the Al-Abeid and the Al-Tammuz rockets were still only in development when we smashed the facility at Saad-16. The Al-Abbas and the Al-Badr, same thing. Inoperative—either smashed up or a too-small payload.”

“What about the Scud?” asked Laing.

“Same thing,” said the general. “The long-range so-called Al-Husayn keeps on breaking up on reentry and has a payload of 160 kilograms. Even the basic Soviet-supplied Scud has a maximum payload of 600 kilograms. Too small.”

“There’s still an aircraft-launched bomb,” pointed out Barber.

The Air Force general glowered. “Gentlemen, I will give you my personal guarantee, here and now: From henceforth, not one single Iraqi warplane will reach the border. Most won’t even get off the tarmac. Those that do and head south will be shot down halfway to the border. I have enough AWACS, enough fighters—I can guarantee it.”

“And the Fortress?” asked Laing. “The launch pad?”

“A top-secret hangar, probably underground, a single runway leading from the mouth; housing a Mirage, a MiG, a Sukhoi—tooled up and ready to go. But we’ll get it before the border.

The decision rested with the American general at the head of the table.

“Are you going to find the repository of this device, this so-called Fortress?” he asked quietly.

“Yes, sir,” said Barber. “We are trying even now. We figure we may need a few more days.”

“Find it, and we will destroy it.”

“And the invasion in four days, sir?” asked Laing.

“I will let you know.”

* * *

That evening, it was announced that the ground invasion of Kuwait and Iraq had been postponed and rescheduled for the twenty-fourth of February.

Later, historians gave two alternate reasons for this postponement. One was that the U.S. Marines wanted to alter their main axis of attack a few miles farther west and that this would require troop movements, transfer of stores, and further preparations. That was true, too.

A reason later advanced in the press was that two British computer hackers had cut into the Defence Ministry computer and badly dislocated the collation of weather reports for the attack area, causing confusion over the choice of the best day for the attack from the climatic point of view.

In fact, the weather was fine and clear between the twentieth and the twenty-fourth, and it deteriorated just as the advance began.