Page 17 of Cry Havoc (Tom Reece #1)

GRU Headquarters

Moscow, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

“ENTER.”

The door to Mikhail Lavrinenko’s office opened, and an army major in a spotless uniform stepped inside, closing the door behind him and coming to attention. “Major Kirill Dvornikov reporting, General.”

Blond with close-cropped hair, square shoulders, and a chiseled jawline to match, he looked like a model for a Red Army propaganda poster.

Lavrinenko was well aware that Dvornikov might look like the ideal soldier, but he had not done any real soldiering since training.

His career had been spent on the intelligence track with a posting to the Paris Rezidentura, one that had produced exceptional results.

Lavrinenko’s predecessor had thought the major had grown too accustomed to life in France and had taken the precautionary measure of recalling him to Moscow and assigning him to the Vietnam desk.

His mission was to continue to stall American involvement in Vietnam, bog them down in the quagmire that distracted from the Soviet threat and fostered domestic division.

The major had been so successful that he now oversaw all GRU operations in Southeast Asia.

Director Lavrinenko dabbed the corners of his mouth with a soiled napkin and dropped it into a drawer where he had just placed his jar of caviar and spoon, gesturing to the chair in front of the desk as he did so.

“I believe you know Deputy Director Penkovsky.”

“Colonel,” Dvornikov acknowledged the man to the director’s right as he took his seat.

“You requested the meeting,” Lavrinenko said.

“Yes, General. I thought we might discuss the U.S. spy vessel taken off Korea.”

“That is a bit removed from your area of concentration.”

“True, but I think there is a connection. It would help if I knew what was recovered.”

“What if I was to say that you have no need to know in your current assignment?”

“I believe I do, General.”

A bit of insubordination leaked into the major’s voice.

Perhaps a trait he had picked up in Paris?

Lavrinenko respected that. He had encountered too many officers of late whose fear of consequences paralyzed them from taking risks.

An inevitable effect of their system. In this game, taking risks was necessary if one were to counter the American foe in any meaningful way.

He looked to Penkovsky, whose expression remained unchanged.

He nodded, indicating Major Dvornikov should continue.

“General, it is my understanding that the American spy vessel was captured largely intact by our DPRK allies. For years we have been unable to decode the NSA’s encrypted communications.

If that were to change, we would have an unprecedented opportunity to use that decryption technology against the Americans in Vietnam. ”

“If we did indeed acquire the ability to decrypt NSA communications, what do you propose?” the general asked.

“First, we do not want to tip off the Americans that we have the technology. From what I know about decryption, the hardware—the physical equipment—will not work without keying material that can easily be changed, rendering the cryptologic machines useless. If we were to take action against the Americans based on a decrypted message in let’s say, Europe, the timing between a message sent and an operation blown is too coincidental to be anything else; the Americans would know we have their machines and keying technology. ”

“I see you have read your Voennaya Mysl journals. Get to the point, Comrade.”

“Yes, General. In Southeast Asia, specifically in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, countries the Americans enter in violation of international law, they conduct operations with a higher frequency than they do anywhere else in the world. They are losing so many men already that, as long as the numbers remain steady and do not spike, they would not be tipped off as to how we are thwarting their missions.”

“If we are already compromising them, how does this help us, if we don’t want the numbers to spike?”

“Because now we can plan. We would know who is going, how many, and be privy to mission specifics. If it’s a wiretap mission on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we can arrange to transmit disinformation.

That is a team and mission we would not want to interdict.

If it is a raid on a weapons cache or a reconnaissance or ambush, we can be set up not at an insertion or extraction, which is where we typically interdict, but at their overnight sites or target sites when their helos are hours away.

We can be ready to take them with a special counter mission in mind. ”

“And what would that be?”

“Capture.”

“The Laotians, Cambodians, and North Vietnamese are already capturing and interrogating American soldiers.”

“Yes. But many American soldiers are killed. These are their most highly trained men. When they are killed, we lose all intelligence value. With advance knowledge of their missions, we can focus our efforts on capture-kill, rather than kill-capture. I know you appreciate the difference.”

“And upon capture, these Americans will continue to be exploited by the Laotians, Cambodians, and North Vietnamese?”

“I propose a different course of action.”

“And what would that be?”

“I propose we bring them here.”