Page 40
Story: The 24th Hour
Dr. Aronson didn’t correct Schneider’s mistake. “I first became her therapist when she was a teenager. Her core personality has aged to match her chronological age, but she still manifests the traits of DID and a few other disorders as well.”
“So, you diagnosed her based on traits you observed in a therapeutic environment,” said Schneider.
“Yes, that’s right.”
Schneider took a half turn toward the jury, then pivoted back to the witness. He said, “So you’re telling us that the diagnosis of DID is based on hypothesis and/or a theory of intermittent behavior, as opposed to a physical illness like, say, cardiomyopathy.”
Aronson asked, “Is there a physical marker for DID? Is that what you’re asking me?”
He’d twisted the question just enough to make Schneider sharpen his point to Mary Elena’s psychological condition.
“Yes, doctor. That’s my question.”
Aronson said, “In some cases, there can be a brain anomaly or physical damage that dictates abnormal thoughts and behaviors. But DID is a complicated disorder that is pieced out through interviews over a period of time.”
Yuki hoped that Aronson was explaining the disorder in such a way that the jurors, even those who had not had therapy, could understand. He talked about the principal marker of the disorder, the two or more distinct personalities as well as depression and gaps in memory that Dr. Birney had also outlined.
Said Aronson, “These memory gaps cannot be attributed to substance abuse or any other physiological diagnosis.”
Schneider said, “So this diagnosis is formed by the attending psychiatrist’s analysis, but two such professionals could arrive at different diagnoses, isn’t that right, doctor?”
Aronson smiled. “Absolutely. But, in my years with Mary Elena, I’ve not only observed her. I have been with her when she dissociates, and I have conferred with other psychiatrists at the hospital where we worked. This is how DID is diagnosed.”
Yuki shut down her urge to shout, “Yeah!”
Aronson looked calm and competent, but Schneider’s expression showed that he hadn’t given up trying to discredit the doctor, and by extension, Mary Elena Hayes.
Schneider said, “Question, Doctor. Did Ms. Hayes havecontrol of her body and her conduct on the day in question at Xe Sogni?”
“Yes. But the guile and the physical strength of the attacker would strongly determine the result.”
Schneider smiled with his mouth but the rest of his face was stony.
“Dr. Aronstein. It’s perfectly clear from what you’ve told us already that diagnosis of DID is somewhat arbitrary, made of observation, gut instinct, or guesswork—not lab tests or radiology or chemistry. In other words, not provable.”
Yuki was on her feet. “Objection, Your Honor. Argumentative.”
The judge sustained the objection.
But Schneider talked over the bang of the gavel and the judge’s voice.
“—and because psychiatry is not considered a true science, the claim that any single person could know what another person suffers from, if anything …”
Yuki, in her best and loudest courtroom voice, said again, “Objection, Your Honor. Not only is counsel’s commentary argumentative, it is irrelevant, immaterial, and clearly prejudicial.”
Schneider shot back, “Your Honor, this evidence is central to showing that the case against my client is faulty and based on unprovable theory …”
The judge, in an equally elevated tone, pounded his gavel harder, saying, “That’s enough, Mr. Schneider. The jury will disregard.”
Despite the judge’s gaveling, Dr. Aronson now joined the free-for-all.
“I don’t agree that the diagnosis of DID and psychiatry itself is arbitrary. Studies are made over decades, consensus is formed, and diagnoses made that are evidenced by statistics and improvement and relief for the patient, sometimes with medication, sometimes partially, sometimes entirely, for the rest of their lives.”
Schneider said dismissively, “I have nothing else.”
Yuki’s voice rang out in the courtroom. “Your Honor, I move to strike …”
At Yuki’s loudly voiced objection, the judge told the clerk to strike Schneider’s cross-examination and the doctor’s response. He added, “There is a time for closing arguments and this wasn’t it. The jury is instructed to disregard Mr. Schneider’s commentary. I will see both counselors in my chambers, now.
“So, you diagnosed her based on traits you observed in a therapeutic environment,” said Schneider.
“Yes, that’s right.”
Schneider took a half turn toward the jury, then pivoted back to the witness. He said, “So you’re telling us that the diagnosis of DID is based on hypothesis and/or a theory of intermittent behavior, as opposed to a physical illness like, say, cardiomyopathy.”
Aronson asked, “Is there a physical marker for DID? Is that what you’re asking me?”
He’d twisted the question just enough to make Schneider sharpen his point to Mary Elena’s psychological condition.
“Yes, doctor. That’s my question.”
Aronson said, “In some cases, there can be a brain anomaly or physical damage that dictates abnormal thoughts and behaviors. But DID is a complicated disorder that is pieced out through interviews over a period of time.”
Yuki hoped that Aronson was explaining the disorder in such a way that the jurors, even those who had not had therapy, could understand. He talked about the principal marker of the disorder, the two or more distinct personalities as well as depression and gaps in memory that Dr. Birney had also outlined.
Said Aronson, “These memory gaps cannot be attributed to substance abuse or any other physiological diagnosis.”
Schneider said, “So this diagnosis is formed by the attending psychiatrist’s analysis, but two such professionals could arrive at different diagnoses, isn’t that right, doctor?”
Aronson smiled. “Absolutely. But, in my years with Mary Elena, I’ve not only observed her. I have been with her when she dissociates, and I have conferred with other psychiatrists at the hospital where we worked. This is how DID is diagnosed.”
Yuki shut down her urge to shout, “Yeah!”
Aronson looked calm and competent, but Schneider’s expression showed that he hadn’t given up trying to discredit the doctor, and by extension, Mary Elena Hayes.
Schneider said, “Question, Doctor. Did Ms. Hayes havecontrol of her body and her conduct on the day in question at Xe Sogni?”
“Yes. But the guile and the physical strength of the attacker would strongly determine the result.”
Schneider smiled with his mouth but the rest of his face was stony.
“Dr. Aronstein. It’s perfectly clear from what you’ve told us already that diagnosis of DID is somewhat arbitrary, made of observation, gut instinct, or guesswork—not lab tests or radiology or chemistry. In other words, not provable.”
Yuki was on her feet. “Objection, Your Honor. Argumentative.”
The judge sustained the objection.
But Schneider talked over the bang of the gavel and the judge’s voice.
“—and because psychiatry is not considered a true science, the claim that any single person could know what another person suffers from, if anything …”
Yuki, in her best and loudest courtroom voice, said again, “Objection, Your Honor. Not only is counsel’s commentary argumentative, it is irrelevant, immaterial, and clearly prejudicial.”
Schneider shot back, “Your Honor, this evidence is central to showing that the case against my client is faulty and based on unprovable theory …”
The judge, in an equally elevated tone, pounded his gavel harder, saying, “That’s enough, Mr. Schneider. The jury will disregard.”
Despite the judge’s gaveling, Dr. Aronson now joined the free-for-all.
“I don’t agree that the diagnosis of DID and psychiatry itself is arbitrary. Studies are made over decades, consensus is formed, and diagnoses made that are evidenced by statistics and improvement and relief for the patient, sometimes with medication, sometimes partially, sometimes entirely, for the rest of their lives.”
Schneider said dismissively, “I have nothing else.”
Yuki’s voice rang out in the courtroom. “Your Honor, I move to strike …”
At Yuki’s loudly voiced objection, the judge told the clerk to strike Schneider’s cross-examination and the doctor’s response. He added, “There is a time for closing arguments and this wasn’t it. The jury is instructed to disregard Mr. Schneider’s commentary. I will see both counselors in my chambers, now.
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